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A B S T R A C T

Decisions on decentralization versus centralization come as a result of strategic choices made
by politicians after weighing their costs and beneﬁts. In authoritarian regimes, the highestpriority political task is that of restraining political competition and securing power in the
hands of the incumbent. This task incentivizes politicians to restrict political decentralization (or at least block reforms promoting such decentralization). At the same time, external
economic pressures (e.g. globalization) place the task of national competitiveness in the
global markets on the agenda, and increase incentives for ﬁscal and administrative decentralization. Thus, political and economic pressures create contradicting incentives, and in
weighing costs and beneﬁts, politicians in different authoritarian regimes make different
choices that lead to variation in the form, degree and success of decentralization/
centralization policies. In this article we compare authoritarian decentralization in Russia
and Kazakhstan.
Copyright © 2018, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

A clear global trend toward decentralization was noted
by experts as early as the 1990s (Dillinger, 1994; Hooghe
et al., 2016; Ter-Minassian, 1997). The role of regional and
local governments is expanding, whether it is reﬂected in
the allocation of political powers and administrative responsibilities or measured by the shares of subnational
governments in total government revenues and expenditures (Arzaghi & Henderson, 2005; Garman et al., 2001).
Decentralization is widely seen as a practice that could
improve quality of governance and promote economic efﬁciency. We are witnessing decentralization in democracies
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and autocracies, though there is signiﬁcant variation in the
concrete manifestations of the process in different regimes.
Theoretical and empirical studies have identiﬁed that decentralization is strongly associated with democracy (Arzaghi
& Henderson, 2005; Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez,
& Yedgenov, 2017; Letelier, 2005; Panizza, 1999; Treisman,
2006). In democracies decentralization is beneﬁcial for political parties and incumbent politicians – it is a “rational
act of political parties seeking to maximize their electoral
possibilities” (O’Neill, 2005, 18). The electoral incentives of
political parties shape important aspects of the design and
the practice of intergovernmental relations as political parties
organize coalition-building between national and local politicians (Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007; Filippov,
Ordeshook, & Shvetsova, 2004; Riker, 1964). A number of
theoretical and empirical studies have also determined
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structural factors modifying and constraining choices of
democratically elected politicians in regard to decentralization. Among the most important such factors are
economic prosperity, country size and diversity (Treisman,
2006).
Much less is known about factors promoting decentralization in authoritarian regimes. On one hand, as the
Chinese example clearly shows, the combination of political authoritarianism and effective ﬁscal decentralization
is possible in practice. In China it works due to the maintenance of political control through party structures
(Blanchard & Shleifer, 2001; Landry, 2008). However, there
is only limited knowledge of why and under what authoritarian regimes promote decentralization and better
governance. According to Faguet and Pöschl (2015) the
understanding of the incentives of non-democratic regimes
to decentralize constitutes “the black hole at the heart of
the decentralization debate that few address and none
have satisfyingly answered.” In particular, little is known
under what conditions and in what forms decentralization could become politically beneﬁcial and attractive for
authoritarian leaders.
The incentives of authoritarian leaders to promote decentralization are especially puzzling in the case of the postSoviet countries. While most of them are low on democracy
scores and are highly centralized politically, the level of ﬁscal
decentralization in many post-Soviet countries is surprisingly high. Indeed, after controlling for a variety of relevant
variables, Treisman concluded that “the former Soviet republics stood out as extremely decentralized given their
other characteristics” (Treisman, 2006, 312). One might be
tempted to explain the high level of ﬁscal decentralization in post-communist countries in the 1990s by the relative
weakness of the newly intendent governments after the
Soviet collapse. But the fact is that the level of ﬁscal decentralization continues to remain relatively high in some
post-Soviet countries. How can we explain the choice of the
decentralization policies in the region dominated by consolidated non-democratic regimes?
We examine the experiences of two largest post-Soviet
countries – Russia and Kazakhstan to advance our understanding of the incentives of non-democratic leaders to
promote or restrict various forms of decentralization. Russia
and Kazakhstan are selected for comparison because they
have many geographical, political and economic similarities but demonstrate distinctive approaches to choice of the
constitutional principles and to decentralization. After
gaining independence, the national elites of Russia and Kazakhstan have made different choices with regard to center–
region relations. Russia’s choice was in favor of federal
constitution (the choice that other things equal means
a high degree of decentralization), while Kazakhstan constitutionally secured the unitary character of the state. Up
to now, the constitutional choices of Russia and Kazakhstan have remained unchanged; however, today the two
authoritarian regimes pursue distinctive policies toward decentralization. Quite paradoxically Russia has a centralizing
regime while still being a formal constitutional federation, while Kazakhstan is still a unitary state, but it actively
seeks to use the practices of ﬁscal and administrative
decentralization.

We suggest that in geographically large and diverse nondemocratic countries their leaders, ﬁrst, secure and centralize
political power, and, second, face the ﬁscal and administrative decentralization/centralization trade-offs. In nondemocratic regimes, the highest-priority political task is that
of restraining political competition and securing all meaningful powers in the hands of the incumbent. This task
incentivizes politicians to promote centralization (or at least
block decentralization-aimed reforms). However, such an
increasing centralization is likely to reduce economic eﬃciency, and, thus it could also undermine political legitimacy
of non-democratic leaders. On the other hand, ﬁscal and administrative decentralization is often presented by experts
as a practice that could increase governance eﬃciency,
provide better bureaucratic control and promote economic competiveness. In particular, economic openness and
external pressures (e.g. globalization) place the task of increasing national competitiveness in the global markets on
the agenda, increasing incentives for greater ﬁscal and administrative decentralization. Therefore, political and
economic pressures promote contradicting incentives, and
in weighing costs and beneﬁts, politicians in different authoritarian regimes make different choices which lead to
variation in the form, degree and success of decentralization/
centralization policies. The article attempts to advance our
understanding “on the limits of the possible” for authoritarian regimes with regard to centralization/decentralization
dilemma in globalized world.
In our analysis we compare two authoritarian regimes
in territorially large countries with similar level of economic development facing challenges of economic
globalization. These two regimes have to promote
competiveness of their national economics and various forms
of decentralization could serve as instruments of such promotion. We show that the responses to the common
challenges are different: though political centralization is
maintained in both Russia and Kazakhstan, in Russia it
is complemented by ﬁscal centralization, and the country
is isolating, closing itself from globalization. On the contrary, Kazakhstan leadership seriously stakes at the inclusion
of the country to globalization processes, and with this
regard launches (or at least declares) governance reforms,
that in particular envisage ﬁscal decentralization.
We conclude that, while preserving political centralization, ﬁscal decentralization is an important part of the
development strategy of Kazakhstan leadership. This strategy aims at combining political legitimacy of the incumbent
with sending a signal to the outside world about the intentions of the national leader to turn his country into
modern nation, competitive and fully included into global
world. Unlike Kazakhstan, in Russia under President Putin
political and ﬁscal centralization develop in one direction,
strengthening each other. Currently, concerns of integration into the global economy that could stimulate at least
ﬁscal decentralization are overshadowed by geopolitical
considerations.
The article is organized as follows. The next section presents theoretical explanations of decentralization in nondemocratic countries and our argument. After that we
discuss similarities and differences in the practice of decentralization between Russia and Kazakhstan.
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1.1. Why authoritarian regimes decentralize
Decentralization in this paper is deﬁned as the assignment of political, ﬁscal and administrative responsibilities
to actors and institutions at regional and local levels (Litvack,
Ahmad, & Bird, 1998, 4). There are various forms of decentralization: constitution federalism; decentralization of the
selection of subnational politicians and policy making; decentralization of ﬁscal policy; and decentralization of public
administration functions. All these forms of decentralization imply some devolution of decision-making powers to
subnational and local governments (Martinez-Vazquez,
Lago-Peñas, & Sacchi, 2017).
There are three broad explanations of decentralization
in non-democratic countries that emerge from the literature. First, the beginning of democratization and the need
for modernization, together with various socio-structural
factors, are typical motivations for making a choice in favor
of decentralization. Indeed, in democracies the beneﬁts of
decentralization can be signiﬁcant. Well-established literature in the ﬁelds of political economy and public choice
explains why decentralization has the potential to improve
the performance of a government (Musgrave, 1959; Oates,
1999). In particular, the theory of ﬁscal decentralization
states that many public goods or services are in fact local
public goods and thus decentralization of their provision
can increase economic eﬃciency. Decentralized governments may be better tailored to the geographical beneﬁt
areas of public goods, and better positioned to recognize
local preferences and needs. In addition, pressure from
inter-jurisdictional competition may motivate regional
governments to be more innovative and more accountable to their residents (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1999; Tiebout,
1956).
Second, many decentralization efforts have been political responses of non-democratic politicians to state crises,
desperate attempts of central elite to hold onto power
(Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). Authoritarian rulers can come
to an agreement with those whom they rule by offering
limited concessions (Gandhi, 2008). Sometimes ruling elites
have attempted to diffuse popular discontent with the performance of the national government by decentralizing some
responsibilities to subnational governments (Hess, 2013;
World Bank, 2017).
Third, the choice in favor of decentralization can also be
explained by external pressures, be these forces of global
competition or the inﬂuence of international organizations and ﬁnancial donors. Indeed, globalization supplies
strong incentives to decentralize the state; it requires better
governance and better economic performance from states,
while decentralization could improve both of them, thus increasing national competitiveness. Strengthening governance
has been a key objective of most decentralization programs implemented in recent years in various countries (De
Mello & Barenstein, 2002). Decentralization is treated by
many experts and practitioners as an instrument to improve
governance and promote bureaucratic eﬃciency of nondemocratic regimes (Ahmad & Brosio, 2006). Particularly,
“in large countries, the principal–agent relations that stretch
from the capital to distant peripheries are too complex, and
the informational advantages of local actors on the ground
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too large, to permit close oversight and control by the center”
(Schedler, 2013, 70–71).
However, most decentralization reforms did not materialize in non-democratic countries. Frequently, such reforms
resulted only in de-concentration e.g. the transfer of powers
and resources to central government agents (bureaucracy) in the regions and local communities. In many cases
“governments simply proclaim that they are decentralizing and enact a theatrical image of reform for their donor
audiences” and foreign investors (Ribot, 2004, 2).
While the beneﬁts of decentralization can be substantial, decentralization is risky for authoritarian regimes, since
it “corrodes authoritarianism by creating loci of power that
can gradually develop into a source of political opposition” (Landry, 2008, 10). Moreover, once institutional changes
are introduced, “they breed contestation as well as local
demands for further decentralization” (Landry, 2008, 10).
Faced with challenges that create incentives for decentralization, non-democratic leaders nevertheless see their top
priority as thwarting challenges to the rule of the incumbent by preventing the expansion of the ruling coalition and
especially attempts to capture political power by regional
interests.
All this brings us to the suggestion that non-democratic
politicians face a tradeoff: the decision to decentralize or
centralize advances some of their political and economic
goals at the expense of others. In other words, political and
economic pressures create contradicting incentives. It means
that strategic politicians in the center will support greater
decentralization or centralization only when they face sufﬁcient pressures to do so.
Theoretically the clearest situation arises when both the
character of national political competition and the pressures of globalization toward increasing national
competitiveness work in the same direction, explaining the
politicians’ choice of decentralization. However, situations that are more interesting for researchers arise when
the logic of national political competition forces authoritarian incumbents to make a non-alternative choice in favor
of political centralization (or at least to block decentralization policy). Then, the incentives for greater decentralization
emerging under the pressure of the global economy collide
with the task of ensuring the incumbent’s political survival. In this situation authoritarian rulers can choose either
to “sacriﬁce” the priority of increasing national competitiveness through decentralization, instead increasing
centralization – both political and ﬁscal, or to choose more
ﬂexible approach combining political centralization with
ﬁscal decentralization.
Below we analyze these two strategies in greater details
comparing cases of Russia and Kazakhstan. In both countries we observe: 1) consistent rejection of political
decentralization in favor of the presidential “vertical of
power”; 2) when decentralization is unavoidable, it practices mostly informally and could be reversed at any
moment. It is with regard to ﬁscal and administrative decentralization as related to economic modernization
(openness and capability of attracting foreign investments) and integration into the global economy where
Russia and Kazakhstan diverge more and more. Unlike
Russia, Kazakhstan is a “normal” state whose development
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is not overburdened by geopolitical considerations, i.e. “great
power” ambitions. In Kazakhstan, president Nazarbayev has
put forward a strategy that aims to transform Kazakhstan
into a modern state integrated into the global economy. As
a part of such strategy president Nazarbayev has repeatedly promised to promote ﬁscal decentralization and local
self-government as an instrument to improve quality of governance and global competitiveness.
2. Similarities and differences in the practice of
decentralization between Russia and Kazakhstan
While we emphasize the differences between Russia and
Kazakhstan in their decentralization strategies, importantly there are many structural, political and economic
similarities between these two countries. In terms of area,
Russia is the largest country in the world; Kazakhstan is also
huge – it is almost eight times larger than Germany. Both
Russia and Kazakhstan have a multiethnic structure and signiﬁcant asymmetries in the distribution of population,
economic opportunities and natural resources across their
regions. The two countries have undergone a painful period
of adjustment from centrally-planned Soviet industrial structure to market economies. In fact, they had roughly similar
industrial proﬁles at the start of the transition: industry accounted for 28% in Kazakhstan and 39% in Russia; while
services made up 43% of Kazakhstani and 47% of Russian
GDP (Åslund, 2001, 37). Since the 2000s both national economies were largely resource-driven, and natural resources had
acted as the cornerstone of the countries’ push to prosperity.
In addition to the common structural factors, political
development in Russia and Kazakhstan also shows many
similarities; in fact, Furman (2005, 197) has argued that “Kazakhstan, in terms of its political structure, is especially close
to Russia; hence a comparison of these two regimes is of
particular interest.” Also, following Olcott one could say that
Russia and Kazakhstan are the most puzzling cases of the
post-Soviet countries “because economic growth seemed
to provide little incentive for political reform; in fact, the
opposite was occurring” (Olcott, 2005, 30). Russia under
Putin and Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev have achieved a
semblance of economic and political stability as their democratic achievements have been curtailed. Russia and
Kazakhstan have a legal opposition, but the system is so
structured that it is impossible for the opposition to come
to power through peaceful means (Furman, 2005). In both
countries the division of power is seriously disrupted in favor
of the national executive; presidents are the main political actors, enjoying a high level of popular support and
relying on a dominant political party which de facto monopolizes the political space.
2.1. Unitary or federal: The reasons for making
constitutional choices in Russia and Kazakhstan
After the Soviet collapse, both Russia and Kazakhstan,
taking into account their territorial size, ethnic diversity and
already existing administrative divisions, faced a constitutional choice between unitary and federal options. However,
in practice the choice was conditioned by institutional framework inherited from the Soviet period and by ethnic factors,

or more precisely by their territorial manifestations, though
in Russia and Kazakhstan this factor played different roles.
In Russia, which has inherited the linkage of ethnic
groups with territorial divisions from the Soviet Union, ethnic
regions pioneered the process of political decentralization
even before federalism was formulated in the Constitution of 1993. In the late 1980s to early 1990s, with the
appearance of a new resource – mass politics – segmental
differences acquired political importance for the ﬁrst time
(especially in economically strong ethnic regions like
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan). It was this process of chaotic
decentralization and extreme weakness of the center in the
early 90s that was later ﬁnalized in the choice of an asymmetrical federation under which ethnically distinct subjects
of the federation enjoyed special status. In Kazakhstan, on
the contrary, the sense of national – primarily Kazakh – identity, and a stronger national center, together with only one
potential threat of separatism in the regions of the north
and east populated mainly by Russians, determined and
made feasible the choice to build a centralized unitary state.
2.1.1. Constitutional choice of federalism in Russia
From the very beginning of Russia’s sovereign existence the issue of center–region relations was one of the
most crucial. The elite of ethnic regions were the most active
in demanding more political autonomy. One of the essential conditions for the realization of a nation-state project
is the existence of a strong and capable national center; this
was deﬁnitely not the case in the new sovereign Russia,
where Moscow in the early 90s became a battleﬁeld between
President Yeltsin and the parliament. The position of a weak
and internally split national center that lost control over the
regions increased the risk of Russia’s disintegration, following the same scenario as the Soviet Union. This explains
why Yeltsin’s key priority in 1991–1992 was to sign a document with the regions where regional executives would
at least express the intention of preserving the territorial
integrity of the country. This document – the Federation
Treaty – was signed on March 31, 1992.1 The signing of the
Treaty eliminated the unitary option for Russia.
Federalism in Russia was in fact “choice without choice”,
an instrument for at least some guarantee of the regions’
loyalty and for the prevention of chaotic decentralization
and ultimate fragmentation of the political and economic
space. Discussions among elite groups were not about the
choice between federalism and unitarism, but rather about
the nature of an “appropriate” federation for Russia, especially with regard to conservation (or cancelation) of the
speciﬁc ethnic regions. Several alternative projects were
under discussion – from the creation of a symmetric federation where all regions would have equal rights and status
(as in the US or Germany) to the project of preserving ethnic
regions and merging all non-ethnic ones into one huge
“Russian republic.”
After the 1993 violent disbanding of Parliament in
October 1993, which was considered by many to be unconstitutional, Yeltsin needed to adopt some version of the

1
The leaders of two autonomous republics (Chechen and Tatarstan)
refused to sign the 1992 Federation Treaty.
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Constitution as soon as possible. Being under time pressure, the president had no real opportunity to weigh the
costs and beneﬁts of different options (within the existing
federal choice); in fact he had no choice other than to enshrine in the Constitution (adopted in December 1993) the
type of federation described in the Federal Treaty – a highly
complex asymmetric federation, consisting of both ethnic
regions (republics, autonomous areas, and autonomous
regions) and non-ethnic territorial regions (regions, territories, cities of federal jurisdiction). Ethnic republics received
the greatest amount of rights (Busygina, 1998).
Quite soon federalism in Russia became the object of
serious criticism. But what was criticized was not the choice
as such, but rather its imperfect implementation (Busygina,
1997; Lapidus, 1999; Lynn & Novikov, 1997; Stoner-Weiss,
1999; Tolz & Busygina, 1997). Said imperfection, however,
did not prevent the federal institutions from surviving (at
least de jure) until the era of the new president, Putin, began
in 2000. Just as the Soviet legacy conditioned Yeltsin’s choice,
Yeltsin’s legacy – the federal constitution – later conditioned Putin’s centralizing reforms.
2.1.2. Constitutional choice of unitary state in Kazakhstan
Oﬃcially Kazakhstan became a unitary state with the
adoption of the second Constitution in 1995, when the
country was for the ﬁrst time directly deﬁned as unitary.2
At the beginning of the 1990s, Kazakhstan experienced a
deep structural crisis like all the other post-Soviet republics, but the regional elites were too weak and disorganized
to form any serious opposition to the president’s choice of
unitarism. As Dave argues, “the Nazarbayev leadership exploited the unitary and centralized institutional framework
inherited from the Soviet period to reject demands for federalism and cultural or territorial autonomy” (Dave, 2007,
120). Such kind of demands have come primarily from
Russian and Uighur political activists, however, have been
rejected by the government, “fearing that federalism would
unnecessarily dilute central authority and foster secession” (Olcott, 2010, 83).
President Nazarbayev sought to prevent even the potential for a threat to the central authorities from the regions,
and immediately after the adoption of the Constitution he
came forward with a program for restructuring the territorial organization of the state. The most serious source of
territorial threat was the concentration of the Russian population in the northern and eastern regions of the country.
This was the legacy of the colonization processes of the
Russian Empire and the Soviet policy of industrialization and
resettlement. Geographically, this heritage took the form of
a territorial split between the north and east of the country,
the regions that were more industrialized, more urban and
dominated by Russians, and the largely rural and Kazakhdominated south and west. During the Gorbachev era the
central government was already starting a project of expanding the primarily southern-deﬁned Kazakh cultural
identity into the Russiﬁed regions of the north (Melvin, 2002,
174). The northern and eastern regions responded by

2

The Constitution of 1993 has not clearly deﬁned form of government.
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creating the “LAD” political movement,3 which, however, did
not manage to win any political representation through elections. The central weakness of this regional challenge to the
central authorities was the lack of a common identity and
common agenda that could form the basis for mobilizing
opposition to the center (Melvin, 2002, 175). The central elite
reacted by strengthening the role of the national executive (the president and his administration) and transferring
the national capital from the north to Astana (formerly
Akmola), which positioned the president to better “proffer
patron-clientelism to the North and to distance himself from
signiﬁcant Southern elite networks” (Cummings, 2005, 104).
In pursuing the general policy of “Kazakhization”, the central
authorities kept in mind the danger of a possible union of
the Northern regions with Russia, and chose a rather modest
version of national identity that was centered on aﬃliation to the state rather than to ethnicity.
In the Concept of National Identity of the Republic of Kazakhstan approved by the presidential decree in May 1996,
the unitary choice of Kazakhstan was deﬁned as “historically immutable fact.”4 Moreover, President Nazarbayev
emphasized that “Kazakhstan is a unitary state, not a federation, so in matters of public administration it must only
draw on the experience of unitary states, in order not to lose
the thread of vertical control.”5
This decision by the central elite was accepted in Kazakhstan almost unconditionally – political demands to
change center–region relations in favor of more regional autonomy were virtually absent. As Hess pointed out:
“Nazarbayev effectively isolated his potential political rivals,
secured the loyalty of his in-regime clients, avoided the territorial fragmentation of the country, and consequently
enabled his inner circle of friends and family to enrich themselves by plundering the extensive energy and mineral
resources of the country” (Hess, 2013, 157).
3. Patterns of political centralization
After the Soviet collapse, presidential incumbents promoted greater political centralization both in Russia and
Kazakhstan. However, in Russia the tendency toward greater
political centralization was not linear, though since 2000s,
there was a clear trend of ever increasing centralization
(Libman, 2010). Russia is formally a federal state, but currently the practice of political relations between federal
center and the regions can hardly be described as federal.
Kazakhstan pursued a steadier course of political centralization after the Soviet Union collapse. In summary,
Nazarbayev adopted policies that sought to “maximize the
power of the center generally and the power of the presidency speciﬁcally” (Cummings, 2005, 105). The literature
supports the claim that the process of political centralization in Russia and Kazakhstan has been completed in the
3 “Lad” is an Old Russian word for a broad mutually beneﬁcial agreement or consensus.
4
Kontseptsiia formirovaniia gosudarstvennoi identichnosti Respubliki
Kazakhstan. Rasporyazhenie Presidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan № 2995.
May 23, 1996 (Online at http://kazakhstan.news-city.info/docs/sistemsl/
dok_pegeez.htm).
5 www.nomad.su/?a=3-200304040023.
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2000s. Nazarbayev has redeﬁned the national political
system and the center–region relations in a manner that was
similar to Putin’s “power vertical” (Peyrouse, 2012).
3.1. Ebbs and ﬂows of political decentralization in Russia
After the collapse of Soviet Union, the Kremlin was progressively losing its leverages of inﬂuence over the situation
in the regions, and the degree of uncontrolled decentralization in Russia reached its maximum by the time of the
1996 presidential election. Bilateral treaties signed during
the 1990s between Moscow and the regions, direct elections of governors, that gave them powerful source of
legitimacy, as well as changing the procedure of formation of the Federation Council6 all contributed to a dramatic
increase in regional autonomy.
This general vector to decentralization has coincided with
Western expectations and policy recommendations. During
1990s the West promoted Russia’s reforms aimed to consolidate democracy and develop market economy. In
particular, President Yeltsin counted on the European Union
support as it was an important source of his legitimization in the eyes of many Russian citizens. Since 1991, the
EU promoted the TACIS program in order to assist political
and economic transformations in the former Soviet Union.7
Cooperation within the TACIS framework involved various
speciﬁc programs, some of them promoting political and
ﬁscal decentralization in Russia. Thus, the demands from
the regions for more autonomy have coincided (at least technically) with the EU expectations of Russia’s reforms.
The “high tide” of decentralization under President Boris
Yeltsin was followed by powerful ebb – a renewed drive to
recentralize governance under President Vladimir Putin. It
was the “Yeltsin federalism” that Putin began to destroy prior
to his other political innovations. Putin terminated the practice of power-sharing treaties between Moscow and the
regions and successfully marginalized the Federation Council
(the upper legislative chamber), swiftly erasing prior regional gains by forcing the conformity of regional legislation
with that at the national level.
The most signiﬁcant immediate institutional innovation was the 2001 imposition of an intermediate
bureaucratic structure (federal districts) “in the hope that
it can make federal processes both more coherent and more
to the Kremlin’s liking” (Filippov et al., 2004, 303). Technically these districts were nothing more than oﬃces of the
president’s representatives; however “they were vested with
the power to watch, control, and push governors, as well
as to supervise the law enforcement agencies in the region.
Later, when their political mission was mostly accomplished and another system of control (based on Putin’s
“party of power”—“United Russia”) was created, the
6
Instead of direct elections, the seats in the Federation Council (two
for each region) were given to the head of the regional executive (president or governor) and the head of the regional legislative (speaker of
regional legislature).
7
TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent
States) was designed as a tool to assist and to guide political and economic transformations in 13 recipient countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan and Mongolia.

representatives turned to exercising more routine administrative functions” (Goncharov & Shirikov, 2013, 25).
The second and more substantive wave of political centralization came in 2004 when Putin reinstituted the Soviet
practice of nomination (instead of elections) and shuﬄing
the regional governors from the special pool of Kremlinapproved candidates (Ross, 2005). In the old Soviet
“nomenklatura” style, people from one region would be
given leadership jobs in others. Nomination of governors
made them the agents of the federal executive (the principal). Indeed, in the new system the governors were
subordinated to federal authorities and acted on their behalf,
while the latter had at their disposal the instruments to
punish or to award them.
In 2012, at the end of Medvedev’s presidency, the institution of elections of regional executives was restored due
to the constant demands of the opposition and the scandalous resignation of Moscow mayor Luzhkov. However, a
candidate for this position must pass through municipal and
presidential “ﬁlters”, resulting in strict built-in selection bias.8
Moreover, as Reuter (2017) shows, “the Kremlin has kept
tight control over gubernatorial elections, and Putin retains
the right to remove governors from oﬃce” (Reuter, 2017).
In March 2017 Russia witnessed a wave of gubernatorial resignations – ﬁve in two weeks – these oﬃcials resigned and
were replaced in rapid succession, in particular, by those
who “had never set foot in the region, even as a tourist.”9
When deciding on new candidate for gubernatorial oﬃce,
the main thing was not regional identity of a candidate, but
conformity to “proﬁle of an ideal governor” elaborated in
presidential administration.10

3.2. Steady political centralization in Kazakhstan
President Nazarbayev’s position in the Kazakhstan political system was much more secured than Yeltsin’s situation
in Russia. After the Soviet Union collapse, Nazarbayev’s ﬁgure
quickly became a symbol of political and economic stability of the new independent Kazakhstan; he cemented the
system, having stable support in the parliament and within
population. This was in part because the president of Kazakhstan skillfully promoted his personal authoritarian rule
at the expense of economic reforms and emerging democratic institutions.
Nazarbayev’s focus on maintaining his personal power
limited the scope of political and economic transformation in the 1990s (Kesarchuk, 2015). Importantly, large scale
market reforms in Kazakhstan did not occur until after presidential power had been consolidated using informal means
(Isaacs, 2010). Gradual political centralization enabled the
central authority to oust regional competitors and monopolize resources through emaciating regional powers, moving
8 To be registered as a candidate for the governor’s oﬃce, one must gain
support from 5% to 10% (depending on the region) of the deputies at the
municipal level, and the deputies that support this candidate must represent not less than ¾ of municipal districts. The president has the right
to “consult” with political parties that nominate candidates.
9 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/opinion/how-do-you-get-to
-be-a-governor-in-vladimir-putins-russia.html.
10 http://www.rbc.ru/politics/17/02/2017/58a6ea529a79477d23669cfe.
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the national capital to the periphery, creating top-down
parties and ensuring center–region crossovers in the recruitment process. All these measures made it possible for
the center to buy off regional elites when they need them,
for instance, during election periods (Cummings, 2005, 103).
The Constitution provided Nazarbayev with “veto power
over local and provincial political decisions and the power
to abolish provinces” (Cummings, 2005, 11). Since 1995 he
implemented a signiﬁcant territorial restructuring to disaggregate the Russophone northern regions – ﬁve regions
were fused with their neighbors (Hughes & Sasse, 2001).
A new generation of akims (regional governors) loyal to the
president were appointed in the regions, and “the center
focused on vertical power relations preventing building
strong networks in the regions. By the end of 90s the balance
of power was clearly shifted towards central authorities”
(Melvin, 2002, 178).
A comprehensive summary of the decentralization
process in Kazakhstan after 2000 has been provided by Alexander Libman (2013, 173): “The formal appointment of
akims by the central government made the personnel selection schemes the main instrument of recentralization:
former members of the central government were appointed as akims. Furthermore, the central government reestablished control over oil and gas resources of the
regions… Thus modern Kazakhstan turned into a de-facto
and de-jure highly centralized political entity.”
4. Fiscal decentralization
While Russia and Kazakhstan are highly centralized politically, both countries are among the group of nations with
the high level of ﬁscal decentralization (Landry, 2008;
OECD/UCLG, 2016). Already in 1990s Luong observed that:
“the distribution in expenditures between levels of government in Kazakhstan was similar with Russia. The
similarity is striking, since Russia is a federation and thus
should automatically have a much higher portion of expenditures at the subnational level” (Luong, 2004, 16). Later,
Hess conﬁrmed that Kazakhstan has been operating as a
considerably more ﬁscally and administratively decentralized state than similar non-democratic nations (Hess, 2013,
160).
4.1. Fiscal decentralization in Russia
In Russia the 1993 constitution put a lot of formal powers
in Yeltsin’s hands, but in practice he was quite isolated –
not backed by any political party, in continued conﬂict with
the State Duma, and with his support among the citizens
rapidly declining from the mid-1990s onwards. On top of
that, the country was deeply immersed in structural economic crises and the government constantly suffered from
a lack of budget resources.
Yeltsin’s approach to the regions was determined by the
logic of his political survival and the severe budget restraints. With the limited resources available, Yeltsin had
to preserve the loyalty of the regional bosses through exclusive deals, development of political favoritism and
personal bargaining. As a result, informal institutions and
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rules of the game either began to replace new formal institutions, or to ﬁll the existing institutional vacuum.
As Solnik argued, Yeltsin’s only attempt to impose a universal and transparent set of ﬁscal rules occurred in October
1993, when he “signed a Presidential decree ordering the
Council of Ministers to impose harsh sanctions against any
regions or republics delinquent in the payment of tax revenues to the center… The move was effective, prompting
all but Tatarstan and Chechnya to resume paying taxes to
the federal budget” (Solnik, 1998, 64).
Summarizing the relations between Moscow and the
regions in the 1990s, Young argues that these “were largely
deﬁned through the negotiations and agreements concerning the demarcation of power and authority between the
two levels of government, and include such speciﬁc matters
as the share of tax revenues and the amounts of transfer
payments from one level to another … the ‘federalization’
of Russia is perceived as a result of bargaining, or deals negotiated between different jurisdictions” (Young, 2000, 178).
Elected in 2000, popular president Putin inherited from
his predecessor a constitutionally federal and de facto decentralized Russia. Competent use of the populist rhetoric
of preserving Russia’s territorial integrity, control of the security apparatus and obedience from the parliamentary
majority allowed Putin undertake rapid centralization with
the aim of reining in the independence of Russia’s regional bosses. One should note that there was little resistance
to Putin’s recentralization. All political parties within the
State Duma supported his attacks on the Federation Council
and regional executives. Regional governors themselves also
showed almost no resistance (Filippov et al., 2004, 313).
At some point Putin could probably have put an end to
federalism, but this would require changing the constitution. However, he clearly aimed to destroy political and
economic independence of the regional leaders and, mostly
importantly, the Yeltsin’s asymmetric ﬁscal federalism. The
ﬁrst way of the political centralization was accompanied by
gradual strengthening of ﬁscal one: from 2000 to 2003 the
share of consolidated regional budgets in the consolidated budget of Russia decreased from 45.2% to 40.5%
(Klimanov & Lavrov, 2004, 113).
However, time proved that the “power vertical” build by
Putin that was thought to be the main pillar of centralization did not bring a strict hierarchy of governance; it much
more resembled an informal imperial order (Busygina &
Filippov, 2012). Importantly, regional actors recognize that
the federal center is practically indifferent to many local outcomes of the governance: above all Moscow demands from
regional executives “electoral results” and “political stability” in their regions. As long as such federal priorities
(electoral results and stability) are fulﬁlled, Moscow is willing
to reward regional executives with signiﬁcant discretion elsewhere. Yet, if governors do not deliver pro-Kremlin votes
in federal elections, Moscow could target their replacements for the reason of ‘losing the President’s conﬁdence’.
Since the president does not need to explain the concrete
manifestations of governor’s “misconduct”, “any governor
could be ﬁred at any time depending on the will of the
federal president” (Reisinger & Moraski, 2017, 98).
Discussions on the necessity for urgent modernization
of Russia’s economy to increase its competitiveness in the
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global economy became part of oﬃcial political discourse
under President Medvedev. Economic decentralization was
meant to be a signiﬁcant constituent element of the modernization strategy. The elite had to admit that Russia in its
current state was not capable of coping with the challenges of globalization, and the data fully conﬁrmed this –
the Doing Business report (assessing the situation in 2013,
that is before the crisis in Ukraine and the introduction of
anti-Russian sanctions by the West) placed Russia in 92nd
place in a ranking of 189 countries; for comparison, it was
far below Kazakhstan, which was in 50th place (World Bank,
2014, 3).
Only a few regions had suﬃciently strong local competitive advantages and were successful in attracting
investments; these were the capital cities of Moscow and
St Petersburg, regions with abundant natural resources, as
well as some border regions. Kayam, Yabrukov, and
Hisarciklilar (2011) demonstrate that FDI allocation in the
Russian regions chieﬂy depends on natural resources and
market size. Moscow and the resource-rich Sakhalin region
attracted more than 50% of FDI inﬂow between 1995 and
2012. At the other extreme, regions located in the Russian
South and North Caucasus gained $22 and $4 per capita
Foreign Direct Investments while the Central federal district (mostly Moscow city and Moscow Region) gained $220
per capita. Moreover, “the current highly centralized taxation system does not allow most of Russia’s regions and
municipalities to balance their budgets without external assistance. They are dependent on transfers from federal
budget or regional budgets, respectively, and in many cases
these transfers are the main sources of funding. These transfers reached 35% of federal budget expenses in 2008, 36%
in 2009, and 38% in 2010” (Goncharov & Shirikov, 2013, 34).
In practice, Medvedev’s program of the modernization
never even began, remaining pure rhetoric. Still, until 2014
Russian leadership tried to isolate domestic politics from
international inﬂuences without having to resort to economic and informational isolation. It sought to combine both
effective silencing of pro-democracy critics who might pose
a danger to Russia’s political status quo and openness to the
West (Busygina & Filippov, 2013). This combination stopped
working when Russia’s geopolitical ambitions acquired
greater domestic political importance than considerations
of successful integration into global economy. Russia’s international revisionist behavior – the annexation of Crimea
in the beginning of 2014 and support of separatists in
Eastern Ukraine – had its consequences in the form of progressive isolation and economic recession in Russia. It
required the simultaneous necessity of spending money on
Crimea (a matter of Russia’s geopolitical prestige), on the
Russian Far East and – most important – on fulﬁllment of
social obligations such as payment of pensions and salaries to those employed in the public sector. Such increased
need for ﬁnancial redistribution stimulated further ﬁscal centralization. Overall, since 2005 the share of own regional
revenues in the Russian consolidated budget has declined
by 15 percentage points.11 In fact, by 2013 the share of the
regional budget revenues in the national GDP has

11

http://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2017/03/09/58be66889a794723dadc6dac.

declined to the minimum since 1995 to 9.0 percent
(OECD/UCLG, 2016).12

4.2. Fiscal decentralization in Kazakhstan
In Kazakhstan’s case, the constitutional choice in favor
of the unitary option did not and does not mean that the
state is built as a vertically integrated centralized ﬁscal structure; the government practice is much more complicated,
as the central state must engage in ongoing negotiations with
regional authorities in order to both make and implement
economic policy. As Hess observed, “in spite of the formal
design of the unitary Kazakh state, the system is better characterized by extensive de facto decentralization, where
substantial power and control of state resources have been
wielded by subnational governments” (Hess, 2013, 158–159).
From the ﬁrst years of independence in Kazakhstan, there
were more or less signiﬁcant “traces” of ﬁscal decentralization. In the 1990s the national center was too weak to
suppress regional demands for autonomy from the oil- and
gas-rich regions of Western Kazakhstan. Afterwards the
central executive used the instruments of decentralization to control the regional elites (Libman, 2008, 15). What
is important is that economic decentralization was informal (de facto) rather than formal (de jure), and “the key
difference between de facto and de jure decentralization is
that in the latter subnational control is legally codiﬁed while
in the former subnational control is illegal but nonetheless exists in practice” (Luong, 2004, 8). Luong found a great
deal of evidence proving that “while, on paper, the central
government in Kazakhstan has the sole authority to collect
taxes at all levels of government and set tax rates for the
country (with the exception of a few local taxes), there is
suﬃcient evidence based on these indicators to suggest that
this is not the case in practice. The central tax agencies operating at the subnational levels are not under the exclusive
control of the central government and tax rates are not
uniform, but rather, subject to the needs and interests of
subnational government oﬃcials” (Luong, 2004, 9). “The
result has been a de facto dual subordination of tax administrators to the central tax authorities and to subnational
government oﬃcials, with an important impact on tax collections at all levels of government” (Dabla-Norris,
Martinez-Vazquez, & Norregaard, 2000, 15–16). Luong even
showed that “the distribution in expenditures between levels
of government in Kazakhstan was similar with Russia. The
similarity is striking, since Russia is a federation and thus
should automatically have a much higher portion of expenditures at the subnational level. At the same time,
Kazakhstan differs dramatically from Russia in that there
are no formal expenditure responsibilities” (Luong, 2004,
16). Hess concludes that Kazakhstan has been operating as
a considerably more ﬁscally and administratively decentralized state than similar non-democratic nations (Hess,
2013, 160). According to OECD/UCLG (2016) data, in 2013
the total regional budget revenues were equal to 9.5 percent
of the national GDP (compared to 9.0 percent in Russia).
12
http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/vertikal/272987-regionalnye
-byudzhety-2015-tri-sposoba-resheniya-problemy-deﬁtsita.
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Most recently there was a tendency of increasing ﬁscal independence of the Kazakhstan regions – while in 2012 the
regions kept 28 percent of all taxes collected, in 2015 the
regional share has increased to 33.6 percent.13 In Russia, since
2004 the regions keep less than 30 percent of all taxes
collected.
It should be stressed, that the guaranteed political centralization makes it possible for Nazarbayev to experiment
with informal decentralization practices without any risk
for the powers of the central state. Regardless of the presence of various instruments of decentralization, it has always
had an exclusively ﬁscal and administrative character, never
spilling over to the political sphere which would imply political autonomy of the regions. In other words, informal
ﬁscal decentralization has never translated into genuine
subnational autonomy (Hess, 2013, 161).
For Kazakhstan leadership the goal of including the
country in the processes of globalization was the top priority since the late 1990s. An important initiative of the
central authorities (that also had an impact over territorial relations) was the reform of the Kazakhstan public sector.
The reforms were launched within the framework of the “Kazakhstan 2030” strategy and were meant to facilitate the
country’s economic development and ensure the achievement of its goal of being one of the top ﬁfty competitive
economies in the world by 2030 (Amagoh & Bhuiyan, 2010,
8). The program included civil service and e-governance
reforms, as well as steps toward ﬁscal decentralization
(Bhuiyan, 2010). The President’s Address to the people of
Kazakhstan in 1997 stressed that “power decentralization
and the alignment of authorities to the lower layers directly involved in execution of the activities is so obvious that
central and any other state bodies will demonstrate their
necessity and usefulness. Within the market conditions we
are to establish and strengthen competitiveness between
regions on the principle: the best region is the region with
better living standards. Accordingly, productive forces should
be concentrated in places with better conditions. Regional
competitiveness is to be based on the larger independence of regions, especially in the budget sphere where
excessive centralization is evident.”14
Next, “the concept of separation of powers between levels
of government and improved intergovernmental relations” was
developed and approved by the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan in February 2003. A special working group
on the decentralization of public administration headed by
Dariga Nazarbayeva, the deputy of the Majilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan (and the daughter
of the President) was established in 2004. By 2008 Fitch
Ratings recorded some slow but steady progress in the
process of the regional ﬁscal decentralization.15
As a part of the 2015 presidential campaign, Nazarbayev
put forward the “100 steps to realize ﬁve institutional reforms”

13 https://www.kursiv.kz/news/ﬁnansy/v-kazahstane-idet-ﬁnansovaa
-decentralizacia-regionov/.
14
Kazakhstan-2030. Protsvetanie, bezopasnost i uluchshenie
blagosostoyaniia vsekh kazakhstantsev. The address of President Nazarbayev
to the people of Kazakhstan. October 16, 1997 (Online at: http://
www.akorda.kz/ru/page/kazakhstan-2030_1336650228).
15 http://www.investkz.com/articles/3012.html.
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strategy of state modernization. It was a step-by-step strategy for Kazakhstan’s integration into the global economy
and transforming Kazakhstan into a regional (and, in
time, global) ﬁnancial center attractive for investors, especially for multinational corporations.16 At the elections held
on April 26, 2015, Nazarbayev’s result once again conﬁrmed that there is no alternative ﬁgure in Kazakhstan
politics.17
On a special televised address on January 30, 2017 to the
nation, President Nazarbayev laid out the groundwork of
what he called the “third stage of Kazakhstan’s modernization.” Nazarbayev explained that the ﬁrst [modernization
phase] was the creation of an entirely new independent
Kazakh state on the ruins of the Soviet Union. “The 2nd modernization began with adopting the Strategy-2030 and
creating a new capital city Astana…. The country broke away
from the economic crisis zone and joined the world’s 50
most competitive economies.”18 Nazarbayev posed a challenge of carrying out the implementation of Kazakhstan’s
third modernization – aimed “to create a new model of economic growth that will provide the country’s global
competitiveness.” Fiscal decentralization policy is critical part
of the new program: “in previous years a large number of
functions and powers have been delivered from the central
to the local level. Now they need to back up suﬃcient ﬁnancial autonomy.”
5. Conclusion
Both political and economic considerations come into
play when politicians make the choice between decentralization and keeping the country centralized. The decisions
that come as a result of this strategic choice are made by
politicians after weighing their costs and beneﬁts. Conventional wisdom tells us that in authoritarian regimes the
survival of the incumbent is the most signiﬁcant political
reason for preventing decentralization (or even increasing
the level of centralization). On the other hand, since most
authoritarian regimes seek to integrate into the global
economy, the task of increasing national competitiveness
through stimulating the country’s economic development
may push incumbents to choose a decentralization strategy. Therefore, political and economic considerations can
create contradictory incentives for politicians. Furthermore, their “room for maneuver” is constrained by previous
constitutional choices, which can’t be undone without substantial risk of political destabilization.
After gaining independence, the political elites of Russia
and Kazakhstan have made different choices with regard to
center–region relations: Russia chose federalism while Kazakhstan constitutionally secured the unitary character of
the state. In Russia the constitution has put a wide range
of rights and responsibilities in the hands of the president. However, during the 90s, the size of the ruling coalition,
16

http://top.rbc.ru/politics/24/04/2015/5536538a9a79476c30b4b154.
Nazarbayev was elected by 97.75% of the voters (http://www.zakon.kz/
4707234-itogi-vyborov-prezidenta-kazakhstana.html).
18 http://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_president/the
-president-of-kazakhstan-nursultan-nazarbayevs-address-to-the-nation
-of-kazakhstan-january-31-2017.
17
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together with constant conﬂict with the parliament, deep
structural crisis and the progressive decrease of President
Yeltsin’s popularity made his political survival possible only
through exclusive deals with regional bosses, i.e. through
chaotic and informal political and ﬁscal decentralization that
seriously weakened the Russian central state. Following the
change in structural conditions, the new president Putin dismantled “Yeltsin federalism” by suppressing political
competition, and undertook massive centralization with the
aim of reining in the independence of Russia’s regional
bosses. Until 2014 the strategy of Russian leadership had
been to isolate domestic politics from international
inﬂuences without having to resort to economic and informational isolation. This strategy was abandoned when
Russia’s geopolitical ambitions acquired greater importance than considerations of successful integration into the
global economy. This makes the preservation of current
degree of political and ﬁscal centralization, or even further
centralization the most probable forecast for Russia’s future.
In Kazakhstan, unlike Russia, the president Nazarbayev remained a symbol of the country’s consolidation and
stabilization during the whole period after the country has
gained its sovereignty, and the national leader is not overburdened with geopolitics. Politically the country remains
highly centralized, though the absence of signiﬁcant risks
for the incumbent, and his coherent intention to integrate
Kazakhstan into the global economy, allow Nazarbayev to
experiment with ﬁscal decentralization while maintaining the ﬂexibility of center–region relations.
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